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“The irony is that in all its various guises [...] the web is already so much part of our lives that
familiarity has clouded our perception of the web itself.” (Berners-Lee, 1999, p. 3)
1 Introduction
In the media effects literature, the development of the Internet from a niche to a mass communica-
tion technology has frequently been singled out as a major change in today’s representative democracies
(Bimber and Copeland, 2013; Norris, 1999). However, despite more than two decades of research on
the relationship between the popularization of the Internet and individual aspects of the political life,
the overall effect has remained unclear (see Boulianne, 2009). In fact, two quite contrasting arguments
regarding the role of Internet exposure for political behavior can be identified. According to the mobi-
lization thesis, Internet use is linked to the alleviation of educational levels in recent decades. Hence,
Internet exposure is seen to exert a positive influence on the participatory, motivational and affective as-
pects of individual political behavior. A second line of argumentation, in contrast, identifies the Internet
as one of the drivers behind the widespread disengagement in established democracies (Norris, 2000).
This scholarship suggests that more intense Internet usage leads to political alienation, radicalization,
and a decreasing motivation to engage in politics. Both arguments are usually applied to all the different
facets of political behavior, which is why studies on Internet effects come to quite conflicting conclusions.
Moreover, the persistence of contradictory empirical evidence provided in support of either the mobiliza-
tion or the disengagement thesis seems annoying if we consider that the Internet nowadays is part of the
lives of an overwhelming number of people.
In this contribution, we try to show that part of the confusion around the effect of Internet expo-
sure stems from an over-simplified theoretical conceptualization of the characteristics of the Internet as
a politically relevant means of communication. This, in turn, has led to the misconception that the
Internet affects all individual aspects of political behavior in the same way. Most importantly, political
communication in the Internet is set apart from communication in traditional media by its decentralized
and interactive nature. Our theoretical model takes into account these distinct characteristics of the
Internet, relying on the previous literature on selective exposure, credibility verification and information
cost lowering. More precisely, we expect the Internet’s influence to vary depending on the different as-
pects of political behavior: Internet exposure leads to increasing political polarization, less individual
trust in government, more interest in politics, but does not affect political sophistication. Drawing on
data from the Swiss Household Panel from 2000 to 2009 as well as from 36 surveys of popular votes in
Switzerland from 2000 to 2010, we assess this ambivalent overall effect of the Internet. By factoring in
vote-specific instead of general Internet exposure, by controlling for other potentially influential media
effects, and by applying panel and sample selection correction models, we are able to avoid some of the
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limitations of previous research designs. Politicized Internet users are rebels without a clue: they are
considerably more motivated, skeptical and radical in their ideological positions than the non-users; at
the same time, however, they are not more sophisticated in politics. Compared to the influence of other
means of communication, the Internet resembles political campaign media such as flyers but does sharply
contrast more traditional media such as TV, radio, newspapers as well as official information bulletins.
2 Internet usage and political behavior
The onset of the Internet age was accompanied by studies focusing on social inequalities regarding the ac-
cess and usage of the Internet (for a comprehensive overview, see Gibson et al., 2005; Zillien and Hargittai,
2009). Resource-specific attributes, such as education and income, and socio-structural characteristics,
such as age or gender, were found to structure both, the access to the Internet (digital divide thesis),
as well as the skillfulness of Internet usage (knowledge gap thesis). Likewise, a heightened debate broke
out whether Internet exposure is positively (e.g. Horrigan et al., 2004; Negroponte, 1995) or negatively
(e.g. Sunstein, 2001; Krueger, 2002) linked to democratic citizenship. In the beginnings of social science
research on the Internet, observers were quite evenly divided between those predicting the Internet to
lead to an increasing ‘disconnection’ from the oﬄine political life and those praising its merits as a ‘liber-
ation technology’ for political engagement (Shah et al., 2001, p. 141). Recent scholarly debates shifted to
more particular inquiries into the relationship between Internet exposure and different aspects of political
behavior (Bimber and Copeland, 2013; Lawrence et al., 2010; Davis, 2009). As Internet usage has become
more common in established democracies, it is increasingly possible to break down broad questions (such
as the consequences of the Internet for the quality of democracy) into more specific aspects regarding,
e.g., Internet effects on political knowledge, polarization or political participation (Farrell, 2012). As-
tonishingly, however, not much has changed with respect to the interpretation of Internet effects. Most
scholars still categorize the Internet effects on different forms of political behavior as generally optimistic
or pessimistic (Xenos and Moy, 2007).
According to the optimistic ‘mobilization’ thesis (Norris, 2001; Nam, 2012), the Internet bears the
potential of attracting new people who are underrepresented in more traditional forms of political en-
gagement. First of all, the Internet is said to raise the citizens’ ability to acquire and communicate
information about politics. With decreasing information costs, an extended range of opportunities for
political engagement becomes available to a growing number of individuals (Lev-On and Hardin, 2008;
Quintelier and Vissers, 2008). Most notably, the Internet is expected to enable the young, who generally
are not very interested in politics (Gibson et al., 2005). Further, as an interactive medium, the Internet
is perceived to strengthen the linkages between citizens and political elites through online engagement
processes such as online petitions, debating in political fora, micro-blogging and so forth (Di Gennaro and
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Dutton, 2006). This promises let some observers to argue that the openness and equality of opportunity
in Internet politics might be a solution to the ‘democratic deficit’ many institutions in established democ-
racies face (Coleman and Blumler, 2009). If citizens interact more intensely with public officials, they are
better able to hold them accountable, and so trust in institutions should increase (Kenski and Stroud,
2006). In sum, optimists believe that the Internet promotes democracy in a variety of ways, “typically
by lowering the costs of communication, association, and participation” (Xenos and Moy, 2007, p. 706).
This ‘mobilization’ thesis is supported by ample evidence of an activation of voters by digital campaigns
in national electoral contests in the U.S., Australia and most Western European countries (see Lilleker
and Jackson, 2011; McAllister and Gibson, 2011; Sudulich and Wall, 2010; Wallsten, 2010; Kluver, 2007;
Marcinkowski and Metag, 2013; Tolbert and Mcneal, 2003).
On the other hand, pessimists caution that the Internet may bring about a decline in political en-
gagement (Sunstein, 2001; Putnam, 2001). This line of argument, which might be termed the ‘disengage-
ment’ thesis, posits that individuals substitute real-life interactions with Internet usage, which exposes
them more heavily to selective information exposure and thus exacerbates their political predispositions
(Stroud, 2008). In addition, there are many difficulties to finding accurate political information online
(Xenos and Moy, 2007). Not only the sheer volume of information may be overwhelming, but also the
widespread distortion and impoverishment of knowledge in online public communication may lead to
a lower capacity to understand the political world. As a consequence, feelings of alienation increase,
internet users become politically more radical and have less trust in political institutions as well as a
lower propensity to participate in politics (Johnson and Kaye, 2003). Disaffection may be particularly
pronounced for the less educated individuals, which is why the Internet only reinforces existing partici-
patory divides (Norris, 2001, p. 13). To conclude, pessimists maintain that the Internet might harm the
political life of individuals in a variety of aspects instead of enabling them to become knowledgeable and
active citizens.
Thus far, the literature has extensively tested the key propositions of both the mobilization and
disengagement theses, with mixed results and no firm conclusions (Boulianne, 2009; Gibson et al., 2005;
Quintelier and Vissers, 2008). As will be discussed in the following, much of this scholarly disagreement
stems from an incomplete theoretical argumentation as well as from oversimplified research designs. As far
as the theoretical argumentation is concerned, there is not enough emphasis on the particular nature of the
Internet as a means of communication. More precisely, we maintain that the the Internet’s specific network
structure and interactive characteristics underlie the causal relationships between Internet exposure and
political behavior such as the lowering of transaction costs, credibility verification problems and selective
exposure (see Farrell, 2012). It thus seems clear that that the Internet neither generally harms nor
generally benefits all different facets of political behavior.
We study the relationship between Internet exposure and political engagement in the context of Swiss
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popular votes (Vox surveys) from 2000 to 2010, as well as in the context of Swiss Household Panel (SHP)
surveys from 2000 to 2009, which has a number of advantages. First, most of the research so far has
been conducted during election campaigns in majoritarian democracies such as the US or the UK. With
its strong federalist structure and the frequent direct democratic decision-making processes, Switzerland
is an interesting case which complements extant studies. Second, the data allow us to study the effect
of the Internet over time. Many studies include only one electoral contest or one survey round (e.g.
Wang, 2007). This makes it difficult if not impossible to discern general from time-bound effects (Xenos
and Moy, 2007). We use data that reach back to the start of the more broader diffusion of Internet
usage in Switzerland. In 2000, only about 25% of Swiss citizens had access to the Internet, but this
number has risen to about 80% in 2010. Therefore, we are able to study the Internet effect both in the
early adoption phase as well as during the time Internet use became more widespread in the general
population. Third, some inquiries confuse general with specific political Internet usage (e.g. Nam, 2012),
and do considerably overestimate the Internet effects on political behavior. The reason why this is the
case can easily be seen by a comparison of general and vote-specific Internet exposure in Switzerland
(see Figure 1). While general Internet usage has skyrocketed, usage that is related to direct democratic
votes has only moderately increased. Thus, if we are interested in the effects of the Internet on political
behavior, we need to concentrate on the 22% of voters who are relying on the Internet for their political
opinion making, and not on the 80% of individuals living in a household with Internet access. We avoid
this by focusing on vote-specific Internet usage in the Vox surveys.
Figure 1: Internet usage and media exposure in Switzerland, 2000-2010
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Fourth, since effects on political behavior are highly continent on the individuals online communication
preferences, we will also compare different kinds of Internet exposure in the SHP data (Xenos and Moy,
2007). Fifth, if we seek to tease out specific Internet effects on political behavior, we need to control for
the effect of other media on the individuals’ political behavior (but see, e.g. Gibson et al., 2005; Bailard,
2011). Figure 1 shows that while the vote-specific Internet usage shows the only continuous upward trend
in the Swiss media landscape, it still considerably lags behind other political information sources such
as newspapers, television, radio or official campaign information provided by the public administration.
We will control for these influences. Sixth, the limitation of the target group potentially induces a severe
selection bias into the analyses of some studies. Some studies restrict their analyses to only specific parts
of the universe of Internet users (e.g. blog readers, Lawrence et al., 2010), while others exclude the non-
Internet users altogether (e.g. Wang, 2007). We use sample selection models to avoid similar problems.
A final important caveat, obviously, is endogeneity. According to the best of our knowledge, only one
study considers a panel analysis to corroborate the direction of Internet effects (e.g. Stroud, 2008). The
SHP data used to complement the analysis of vote surveys allow us to assess the direction of the effects
we find in the vote surveys over a panel of four years.
3 How the Internet affects the electorate’s polarization, moti-
vation, trust and sophistication
To understand the importance of the Internet for the citizen’s political life, it is helpful to understand its
basic communication architecture – just like institutions such as laws or social norms – to provide a set
of constraints and opportunities for different kinds of political behavior (Farrell 2012, Lessig 1999). And
although different Internet-based technologies may lead to somewhat different political outcomes, there
are two fundamental aspects which separate the Internet from other communication media such as TV or
radio. From its beginnings, the Internet has been built and extended around the improbable combination
of low access barriers and decentralized control of information on the one hand and heavily monopolized
provision of infrastructure on the other. This ambivalence originates in the emergence of the Internet as
a communication infrastructure during the Cold War. Although maintained by the US-military, it was
mainly designed by a network of scientists organized in a distinctly flat hierarchy (Rosenzeig, 1998). The
centralized administration of the Internet’s infrastructure is predominant until today, e.g. all domain
names and Internet protocol addresses are still coordinated by one single organization (ICANN, i.e. the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers). The usage of the Internet, however, is largely
decentralized. This can most clearly be seen in the standards structuring all communication and infor-
mation retrieval activities on the Internet (the TCP/IP, i.e. the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
protocol), which allow the integration of all possible kinds of communication, be it many-to-many, one-
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to-one, one-to-many or many-to-many (see DiMaggio et al., 2001, 102). And ‘network neutrality’, i.e.
the obligation of Internet providers to let pass all messages disregarding of their content, is still a major
guideline for legislation in the online environment. In the absence of state censorship, this leads to the
distinctly fragmented as well as interactive nature of political communication in the Internet.
Of course, the Internet also heavily integrates traditional forms of communication and many online
activities in fact consist of traditional media consumption. But its information infrastructure differs from
other types of media insofar as it allows for the dissemination of information among people with less
intervention by central players such as journalists, or state officials. As information is produced and
consumed in a more decentralized way, communication networks develop more rapidly and on an ad
hoc basis. This resonates with Wellman’s (1999) argument that with the emergence of ‘global villages’
the Internet contributes to the decoupling of community and geographic vicinity(DiMaggio et al., 2001).
While Norris (2000) shows that the growth of private TV and radio markets has led to a fragmentation
of the media system and the professionalization of political campaigns until the end of the 1990s, even
more fragmentation of the media system as well as a shift from centralized to – still professionalized –
but less hierarchically organized political campaigns should therefore be expected with the rise of the
Internet (Sudulich and Wall, 2010; Wallsten, 2010). On the one hand, the fragmentation of media is
continuing with the digitalization of traditional media as well as the emergence of a number of extensive
social media networks. On the other hand, campaigns are reorganized into decentralized, more horizontal
network structures, since the Internet increases the interaction between candidates or party organizations
and supporters.
Figure 2 illustrates this general idea of more fragmentation and interaction in online communication.
First, information in publicly controlled traditional media such as public service radio, TV or state
controlled newspapers, flows from one central sender to many dispersed receivers (graph 1 in Figure 2). In
Switzerland, the official information bulletin provided by the Federal Council for every vote comes closest
to this type of communication. Second, private traditional media systems (graph 2) are characterized
by the distinction between senders and receivers of information as well, but there is a certain division of
labor among different media institutions in terms of the consumers they reach. Despite long-lasting trends
towards more centralization, the radio and print media markets still possess a considerable heterogeneity
of formats and ideological leanings in Switzerland. The TV market, by contrast, might be closer to
the ideal type illustrated by graph 1, since it is heavily dominated by the Swiss public broadcaster (the
SRF). Finally, as shown by graph 3, the Internet to some extend blurs the distinction between senders
and receivers of information and leads to less hierarchical flows of information.
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Figure 2: Communication networks for public service broadcasting (1), traditional private media (2) and
the Internet (3)
2 3
1
Note: Stylized graphs, adapted and amended from Hassanpour (2014);
squares symbolize senders, dots receivers of information.
If we move from a communication infrastructure which resembles graph 1 to one similar to graph 3,
three distinct mechanisms of influence on political behavior can be identified. Most intuitively, the inter-
active network character of the digital environment can be linked to a dramatic reduction of transaction
costs (Lev-On and Hardin, 2008). Internet-based communication can rely on an enormous amount of
information, is able to rapidly disseminate political messages and can connect like-minded people over
long distances. The possible benefits of the lower cost of and easier access to information are clearly man-
ifest in the upsurge of online collective action which is initiated by numerous political players including
grassroots movements, political parties, governments and interest groups (Krueger, 2006). Accordingly,
an increase in Internet exposure should thus first of all be connected to an increase in the motivational
aspects of an individual’s political behavior:
H 1: Internet usage increases citizen’s interest in politics.
Consequently, communication in the Internet could therefore approximate “a situation of perfect knowl-
edge” where people fast and comprehensively gain knowledge about politics (Polat, 2005, p. 453). How-
ever, authors such as Metzger (2007) caution that online communication may reduce the individuals’
capacity to verify the credibility of the information they receive. As a consequence of the decentralized
communication in the Internet, nearly anyone can be a sender of information, and messages may often
not be filtered by professional gatekeepers. Additionally, online sources frequently lack information on
the author identity or reputation, which increases the difficulty to judge their trustworthiness. Digital
information may thus be more easily altered or misrepresented compared to the content provided by
traditional media (Metzger, 2007). Since the lowering of transaction costs facilitate access to valuable
political knowledge via the Internet, but problems of credibility verification work against it, the following
hypothesis can be formulated:
H 2: Internet usage has no effect on citizen’s political sophistication.
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Besides the lowering of transaction costs and the problems of credibility verification, selective exposure,
i.e. the selection of sources that match one’s own beliefs and predispositions (see Freedman and Sears,
1963), further shapes political behavior. In contrast to past times – when (Zaller, 1992, p. 193) concluded
that the majority of people is “simply not so rigid in their information-seeking behavior that they will
expose themselves only to ideas that they find congenial” –, selective exposure is assumed to have become
more widespread in the Internet age (Farrell, 2012). With respect to political information seeking, people
can more easily choose to follow sources whose political perspective matches their own. At the same
time, they expose themselves less likely to opposing views (Sunstein, 2001). Lawrence et al. (2010), for
example, show that partisan blog readers are considerably more radicalized than partisan TV viewers.
On the aggregate, citizen’s with an intense Internet use are thus expected to be taken further away from
the political center in the direction of their political predispositions (Stroud, 2010).
H 3: Internet usage is positively related to ideological radicalization.
In addition, the interactive nature of communication in the Internet makes it far more likely that
individuals with unusual interests will find each other, because it vastly expands the set of actors with
whom one can meaningfully interact (Benkler, 2006). Therefore, the communication networks tend to
be more homogeneous online than oﬄine, which bears the potential for a polarization of the electorate
and the erosion of traditional loyalties (Morozov, 2011). Internet skeptics such as Lawrence et al. (2010)
consequentially argue that going online erodes weakens real-world ties. The main reason again is selective
exposure, which is why online political debates more often perpetuate traditional political borders and
are followed by a relatively small and isolated population (Nahon and Hemsley, 2011). Compared to
national political campaigns which are sustained by using traditional media, communication networks in
the Internet thus are more prone to a decrease in trust in traditional political institutions such as the
government (see Sunstein, 2001).
H 4: Internet usage leads to less trust in government.
The latter two hypotheses should not be understood as normative statements, since it crucially de-
pends on the political context whether more radical ideological positions and less trust in government
should be perceived as beneficial or detrimental to the quality of a democracy. For example, in times of
corruption or political gridlock, increasing polarization and distrust in political institutions can mount
pressure on decision-makers to initiate much needed reforms. In already heavily polarized countries which
face a social or economic crisis, in contrast, increasing distrust and polarization may be problems that
compound to the crisis.
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4 Data and methods
For the principal analysis, we use data from the Swiss Voxit-Survey, which is collected after each referen-
dum vote. Our data set contains 36 surveys on 98 votes between 2000 and 20101 with an average number
of 1300 respondents by vote (popular votes take place two to four times a year in Switzerland; voting
submissions are pooled to these dates depending on their number). As already mentioned, this data set
includes a very specific question with regard to the use of the Internet during political campaigns, which
allows us to directly assess the relationship between Internet exposure and political behavior. Further-
more, we distinguish between five different types of media exposure: Internet, newspapers, radio, TV and
campaign flyers. These dummy variables are based on the following question in the Voxit-Survey: How
did you gather information about the vote during the campaign? Through which media did you hear about
the pros and cons of the vote? We will analyze the relationship between media use and four different
aspects of political behavior: Radical ideological positions, trust in government, interest in politics and
political sophistication. Each of the three dependent variables is measured as a binary variable. The
indicator radical positions is based on the individuals’ reported policy position on the left-right scale
(0-10). It takes the value 1 if an individual’s position is below the 25% quantile or above the 75% quan-
tile of the distribution and 0 otherwise. Trust in government is coded 1 if the individual reported that
he or she can rely on our government because it acts to the best of its knowledge and belief and for the
benefit of all. This variable is coded 0 if the individual decided that the following answer was correct:
Our government increasingly decides against the will of the people. It doesn’t know about our sorrows and
wishes anymore. As for political sophistication, we rely on two simple indicators measuring the citizen’s
knowledge about the votes they decided upon. If respondents could indicate the title and some basic
facts about the vote, political sophistication was coded 1. If some of the asked information is wrong or
missing, the variable takes the value 0. Interest in politics, finally, is recoded from a four-item scale into a
dichotomous variable in order to keep the results of the analyses comparable across the different aspects
of political behavior. Accordingly, this variable takes the value of 1 if respondents indicated that are
very interested in politics and 0 if otherwise. Besides our main predictors, we use a range of variables to
control for resources (education and income), socio-demographic determinants of political behavior (age,
gender and place of residence) as well as ideological orientation (left-right placement).
Unfortunately we cannot use simple regression analyses for the obvious reason that the questions
about media influence on the vote decision were only asked if the individual participated in the vote. Our
data thus violate Imbens’ (2004) unconfoundedness assumption. Specifically, we have a strong sample
selection bias, since inferences on Internet users and non-users cannot be extended to the group of non-
voters. As a remedy, the literature suggests a sample selection model (see Heckman, 1976; Imbens, 2004),
which allows to include the propensity to be included in the sample into the actual outcome estimation.
1The question with regard to Internet use was not consistently asked before 2000.
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In a first step, the selection equation is estimated, which needs an instrumental variable as an exclusion
restriction. The choice of the exclusion restriction is essential, since otherwise the selection model could
aggravate the selection bias, which results in confounded standard errors (Sartori, 2003). Our data is
truncated according to whether people actually have participated, we thus need a variable for which there
is information for all individuals in the sample, and which is closely related to participation but does
not show much correlation with our main independent variables of media exposure. The Voxit-Survey
contains a more general question with regard to the perceived frequency of participation, which asks how
often he or she would participate if 10 votes took place in a year. In our view, this is a precise exclusion
restriction. In a second step, the final model on the quantities of interest (in our case regarding political
behavior) is estimated including the information on sample selection bias obtained from the first step.
Complementing the inquiries of the popular vote surveys, we are able to run panel analyses for three
of the four aspects of political behavior using the Swiss Household Panel waves from 2000 until 2009.
The panel consists of two random samples stratified by the seven statistical regions of Switzerland2, one
starting with 12931 individuals in 1999, the other starting with 6569 individuals in 2004. From 2000
until 2009, respondents were asked how often they use the Internet in general. This item is very general
und thus effects of Internet use on political behavior are much less likely to be observed. Moreover, the
question was asked differently in different years. From 2000 to 2003, individuals indicated the estimated
time they are exposed to the Internet per week. From 2004 on, individuals indicated whether they are
using the Internet every day, at least once a week, at least once a month, less than once a month or never.
This is why we could only recover a dichotomous variable were people use the Internet weekly or not.
Despite these deficiencies, the SHP panel data allow an external validation of the findings from the Voxit
data, especially in terms of the causal direction of the effects.
Furthermore, we have data on radical positions – measured on a five-point scale as the deviation of
ideological positions from the mean –, trust in government – an eleven-point scale from no confidence
to full confidence –, and interest in politics – an eleven-point scale from not at all interested to very
interested. We estimate within effect models of Internet use on these three indicators in order to control
for all other potential individual covariates of political behavior.
5 How Internet exposure relates to political engagement
The estimated coefficients of the outcome equations for the models on the four aspects of political behavior
are shown in Table 1. The results of the selection equations are reported in Table 3 in the appendix.
At a first glance, Internet exposure shows the expected relationships with interest in politics, political
sophistication, radical positioning and trust in government. While Internet use is positively correlated
with interest in politics and radical positioning, it is associated with less trust in government. The
2Ticino, Lake Geneva region, Eastern Switzerland, Zurich, Northwestern Switzerland, Swiss Plateau.
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relationship of Internet exposure with political sophistication, in contrast, is not significant. Since these
results, of course, are not effective evidence on the direction of the relationships, an inquiry of SHP
panel data will follow this discussion of the vote survey analysis. To illustrate the results in Table 1,
we plot the simulated differences in predicted probabilities between those who used a specific media to
gather information and those who did not in Figure 3.3 Not surprisingly, the strength of the relationships
between media exposure and political behavior is lower compared to participatory resources such as
education. However, we find clear differences between users and non-users as well as interesting variation
among media types.
According to our first hypothesis, politico-specific Internet exposure should activate citizens, and
hence raise their interest in politics. As shown in the upper left graph of Figure 3, there is indeed a
positive relationship between internet use and political interest. Moreover, compared to consumption of
other media types, TV, radio, official information and campaign flyers, the relationship is stronger and
significant. The results for political sophistication are shown in the upper right graph of Figure 3. On
the aggregate over all 36 vote surveys, the results support the second hypothesis. In contrast to much
of the mobilization literature, which argues with the lowering of costs argument – which argues that
sophistication will increase with lower costs of access to information –, the use of Internet sources for
information is not related to more political sophistication in the context of Swiss votes. This also holds
for TV and radio usage, while the political knowledge of those using campaign flyers is lower than of
non-flyer readers. The only media which are substantially related to a higher political sophistication are
newspapers and official information bulletins.
In sum, our results point to important differences between users and non-users of the Internet with
regard to motivational aspects of political behavior. However, in contrast to traditional means of commu-
nication which distribute dense information on politics, i.e. newspapers and official information bulletins,
the Internet fails to enhance the political sophistication of Swiss citizens.
3We show the predicted probabilities for all other variables fixed at their mean.
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The graph in the lower left corner of Figure 3 shows the differences in predicted probabilities to have a
radical political positioning. In line with our third hypothesis, Internet users appear to have a significantly
higher propensity to take a radical position than non-users. The same goes for those who used campaign
ads and flyers for their vote choice; furthermore, newspaper readers are also slightly more likely to have
extreme political positions. In contrast, the government’s official information and TV seem to have a
moderating effect: those who read or view about the pros and cons of a vote in these media tend to have
more moderate positions than those who do not. The effects of newspaper reading and radio listening
remain unclear. The last hypothesis posits that Internet usage should be associated with less trust in
the political system, because it leads to political fragmentation. In line with this hypothesis, the lower
right graph of Figure 3 shows that unlike other media – such as the government’s official information,
newspapers and radio – the Internet is related to less trust in government. As for other media types, only
campaign advertisement is also negatively related to trust in government, but the differences between
users and non-users are much smaller.
These results support the distinction between hierarchical and more decentralized communication
networks that was put forward earlier: The official information bulletin that is issued by the federal
Council before each vote can be described as an information flow from one central sender to many
dispersed receivers. Hence, it has a moderating effect on political preferences and consumers of this
type of information tend to have more confidence in the political elite. By contrast, political content
distributed on the Internet, as well as via campaign flyers can be seen as decentralized, well-targeted,
and therefore more polarizing information flows. As our results show, campaign flyers and information
gathering via the Internet are both related to a more radical position and less trust.
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Figure 3: Media use and political behavior
Overall, our findings point to a consistent relationship between Internet use and different aspects
of political behavior. Internet users tend to have more radical preferences, are less confident in the
government’s work, but also more interested in politics than non-users. Even though the differences
are fairly small, they are comparable to the effects of other media types and indicate that the use
of the Internet to gather political information is related to a certain political behavior. Besides, our
results show the expected effects for those factors that are described in the traditional literature on
political participation (see Gallego, 2010): resources and socio-demographic characteristics (see Table 1).
Education leads to more trust, political sophistication and increasing interest in politics. In addition,
there is no clear association between education and radical positioning. Income is negatively related to
extreme positions but positively connected to sophistication. As far as trust in government and trust
are concerned, their relationship with income is less clear. Furthermore, elder people show more trust
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and interest in politics but do also exhibit less political sophistication and moderate ideological positions.
Men tend to have more interest and political knowledge, and also hold more radical positions. Finally,
urban and ideologically left-leaning individuals are more interested, sophisticated, radical and trustful
than their rural and right-leaning counterparts. Albeit not the focus of our study, these results support
the robustness of our findings with regard to media use and political behavior, which persist even if we
control for these ‘strong’ predictors of political behavior.
6 Robustness of the findings
So far, the connection between Internet exposure and political behavior was only explored at the most
aggregate level – over all votes – which makes it impossible to explore time-bound effects. In a first
step, we thus include interaction terms between Internet usage and the each vote in the original model
as shown in Table 1 (Results are shown in Table 3 in the appendix). Figure 4 shows the trends of the
differences in predicted probabilities (left scales) from these models along with the share of Internet users
(grey bars, right scale). It is striking that for all aspects of political behavior, the initial phase from
2000 until about 2003 is distinctly different from the later periods. In the early years, the effects are
very volatile due to the low number of Internet users and tend to settle in only after about 2004. After
2004, the share of Internet users increases to above 10% and the predictions become more consistent.
Nevertheless, the relationship between the Internet and political behavior seems somewhat contingent on
the single votes. For all aspects of political behavior, Internet exposure has no significance at some votes.
The results discussed above could thus simply be spurious and due to a mis-specification of the research
period. In a second step to solidify our findings, we therefore ran the models only for the subsamples of
votes from 2004 on – where Internet usage is above 8% – as well as from 2005 on – where Internet usage
is above 10% (Results not shown). In both cases, the findings as shown in Figure 3 remain robust.
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Figure 4: Internet exposure and political behavior over time
In addition, we varied the inclusion of control variables. Most notably, since Gallego (2010) in general
suspects problems due to multicollinearity between income and education, we subsequently excluded
income and education from the models. Only one Internet effect is affected by these changes. Namely,
the models without either income or education excluded show a positive and significant relationship
with political sophistication. However, since this effect disappears when we repeat the analysis for the
subsample of votes where Internet use is above 10%, it seems that – if at all – this is a phenomenon of
the early and very volatile phases of Internet usage.
Thus, the main findings of the Voxit-Analyses seem robust, although at least two major problems
remain. First, for the early periods of Internet usage, there are not enough reliable data to estimate
stable effects. And second, the pooled survey data on popular votes provide evidence on the significance
of the relationships, but we still do not know whether the direction of the effects is as suggested by
the hypotheses. The SHP analyses presented in Table 2 offer potential answers for the three aspects of
political behavior for which we found substantial correlations in Table 1. The effects of Internet usage,
measured as whether individuals used the Internet in general at least once a week, on interest in politics,
radical positioning and trust in government, all show the same sign as in the Voxit-Analyses.
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Table 2: Swiss Household Panel: Internet exposure and political behavior (linear unbalanced panel
models)
Interest in politics Radical positioning Trust in Government
Estimate Std.error Pr(>t) Estimate Std.error Pr(>t) Estimate Std.error Pr(>t)
Internet use 0.110 0.022 *** 0.030 0.017 + -0.039 0.022 +
Individual
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 59526 51660 58005
n 13747 12752 13529
Years 9 9 9
Adj. R2 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001
F-statistic 26.24*** (1/45778 DF) 2.94+ (1/38907 DF) 3.18+ (1/44475 DF)
Notes: P-values: p ≤ 0.001=***, p ≤ 0.01=**, p ≤ 0.05=*., p ≤ 0.1=+
Furthermore, as we have already seen with regards to the Voxit-Analyses, the effects are fairly small.
Weekly Internet usage increases the propensity that a person is one category more interested in politics
by 11%. As for radical positioning, Internet users are 3% more likely to have one point more deviation
from the mean ideological position than non-users. Finally, Internet exposure lowers trust in government
by 4%. The results in terms of radical positioning and trust in government are only significant at the
10% confidence level. However, given that the Internet variable measures general and not politico-specific
Internet usage, the effects could not have been expected as clear as in the Voxit data.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the ambivalent effects of internet use for information gathering on different aspects of
political behavior. The specific network and interactive characteristics of communication in the Internet
involve distinctive mechanism of influence on the individuals political behavior. People who are getting
informed about politics online are subject to selective exposure and more problems of credibility verifi-
cation, but, at the same time, profit from a lowering of information and communication costs. We found
clear differences between Internet users and non-users in terms of the effects of these mechanisms. First,
the results provided support of the disengagement thesis in terms of polarization and trust in national
government. Internet users seem more likely to take a radical ideological position than non-users. This
resembles the effect of exposure to campaign flyers. Other media, and especially the exposure to the
government’s official information, on the aggregate relate to more moderate positions. Unlike traditional
media, Internet usage also is connected to less trust in government. Thus, it is not the case what we know
from oﬄine media exposure, namely that more informed citizens have more trust in national political
institutions. In terms of political interest, however, the results confirm the mobilization thesis: Similar
to other media, Internet users are more likely motivated to engage in politics than non-users. All these
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results do not only show up in the Voxit analyses, but also in the SHP panel analyses. However, one
of the most often stated expectations on the influence of the Internet, namely that it increases political
sophistication due to the better availability of and faster access to information in the Internet, is not
confirmed. In general, Internet use is not related to more knowledge, which might partly be due to the
greater insecurity to assess the quality of the information.
Our analyses of surveys on popular votes in Switzerland thus provided solid empirical results on
Internet exposure by considering only vote-specific Internet exposure, by controlling for exposure to
other potentially influential media, by studying an extended time period, and by providing a robustness
check with an alternative data set. Overall, the Internet effect is fairly small compared to socio-structural
predictors, but this should have been obvious from the beginning. Media exposure will never precondition
political behavior as strongly as long-standing individual characteristics such as education. Compared to
other media effects, however, the results for Internet exposure are remarkably strong, which is especially
interesting if we take into account the fact that much less respondents indicated that Internet usage was
important for their vote decision than the usage of other media such as the press, radio, or TV.
Taken together, the effects of Internet usage sharply contrast with those of other media and especially
with the official information bulletins in terms of polarization and trust in government, while they are
similar in terms of interest in politics. It therefore seems to resemble more a campaign media, which
polarizes but, at the same time, motivates citizens. On the one hand, this can be interpreted as a
confirmation of the argument that the rise of the Internet has been related to more fragmentation of the
media system as well as a shift from centralized to but less hierarchically organized political campaigns.
On the other hand, the cost reduction for information seeking and peer-to-peer communication in the
Internet indeed seem to have a mobilizing effect. The main take from our analyses is thus that the Internet
has neither a completely beneficial nor a completely detrimental, but a rather ambivalent influence on
political behavior in Switzerland. To put it plainly, Internet users are rebels without a clue. They are
interested, polarized, and sceptical, but they do not know more than non-users.
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